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Truth, Masculinity and the Anti-Elitist Backlash against the University in the Age of 
Trump 
Barbara Read, School of Education, University of Glasgow 
Forthcoming (2018) in Teaching in Higher Education.  
 
 
In the past few decades, political correctness – oh, what a terrible term – has 
transformed our institutions of higher education from ones that fostered spirited 
debate to a place of extreme censorship, where students are silenced for the smallest 
of things. You say a word somewhat differently, and all of a sudden you’re criticised 
– sometimes viciously. We will end the political correctness and foster free and 
respectful dialogue (Donald Trump, campaign speech, reported in Morgan 2016) 
 
The global rise of ‘neo-populism’ (Krämer 2014), including the election of the right-wing 
Republican candidate Donald Trump to the US presidency, has been accompanied by a 
notable backlash and resistance to what has been categorised as governing/dominating ‘elites’, 
including the perceived intellectual elites teaching and researching in HE academic 
institutions (Clarke and Newman 2017).  As the quotation from Trump above indicates, right-
wing discourses of ‘resistance’ to university elites are often framed as the encouragement of 
‘free speech’ (‘spirited debate’) as opposed to a perceived climate of censorship on campus in 
the name of ‘political correctness’ (Phipps, 2017).  
 
In this paper I examine some of the arguments put forward by proponents and detractors in 
these debates, utilising some examples from empirical data from a study of online student 
newspaper posts in 2016 and 2017 from campuses in the US and the UK. In doing so I will 
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be arguing that two aligned but distinct discourses – ‘Real World Anti-Elitist’ and the ‘Ivory 
Tower Rationalist, seem to underpin such positions, and that these discourses are highly - yet 
differently - gendered, classed and ‘raced’. I will finish by also briefly discussing an 
alternative discourse that I’ve labelled here as ‘Contextual Progressive’, which underpins 
some of the key arguments in favour of practices labelled by detractors as ‘silencing’ free 
debate. Importantly for educators, these discourses are can be linked to distinct 
epistemological and ontological conceptions of the nature and purpose of academic 
knowledge, conceptions of ‘truth’ and ultimately the nature and purpose of the university 
itself.  
 
Right-Wing Populism and the Anti-Elitist ‘Cultural Backlash' 
 
A resurgent wave of right-wing populism has been notable in many countries in the global 
North in recent years, seen clearly in events such as the Brexit referendum in the UK (Clarke 
and Newman 2017), and the victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential elections. 
The Trump campaign, like other recent populist movements, has utilised explicitly nativist 
(i.e. favouring those born in, or otherwise seen as ‘native’ to a country, in preference to those 
deemed as migrating to it), racist and xenophobic discourses to gain support, alongside an 
explicit anti-establishment ethos that has sparked what the media describes as a ‘civil war’ 
within his own party (Siddiqi 2017). 
 
One common argument is that this international wave of populist sentiment has been fuelled 
by the reaction of ‘working people’ who have felt ‘left behind’ by political and cultural elites. 
The elites are argued in turn to have ignored the decline in economic prosperity of the masses 
of ‘ordinary people’ as a result of forces such as deindustrialisation and globalisation (Elliott 
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2016; Pacewicz 2016). However, as Hustvedt (2017) notes, ‘the problem with this story of 
distraught labourers rising up against abusive, global, corporate power is not that it is wholly 
false, but rather that it is insufficient to explain the rise of Trump’ (62) and other recent forms 
of populist resurgence. She cites a working paper by Inglehart and Norris (2016) whose 
preliminary research finds two distinct arguments put forward for the rise in populist votes in 
31 national elections across the globe – the aforementioned ‘economic insecurity’ thesis, and 
the ‘cultural backlash’ thesis, with the latter holding more evidence in its support.  This 
cultural backlash is identified as a sense of fear and rage felt by those with historically 
privileged statuses in relation to ‘race’, gender, and sexuality who feel such advantages 
slipping away, indeed that, to use an oft-used cliché, the ‘pendulum has swung too far the 
other way’ and they are now victimised by identities that would once have secured privilege 
(Hustvedt 2016).   
 
As the quotation at the beginning of the paper suggests, the radical right attack on political 
and cultural elites certainly includes the ‘intellectual elites’ on university grounds. It needs to 
be stressed that whilst there seems to be a specific resurgence of such views in the last few 
years, such discourses are not new but have a long-established origin – for example, as 
Tobolowsky and Reynolds (2017) recently reviewed, anti-intellectual critical representations 
of HE have been popularly made throughout the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries in 
fictional formats. Rigney (1991) notes that a central feature of anti-elitism is ‘a mistrust of 
claims to superior knowledge or wisdom on the part of an educated elite’ (441).  Ironically in 
the context of the claims made by the right against the ‘censorship’ practices of students and 
academics, a strand of this anti-intellectualism involves a form of ‘anti-rationalism’: a 
resistance and refutation of challenges to the right’s beliefs by academically rigorous 
empirical enquiry and the intellectual ‘pursuit of truth’.  
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Clarke and Newman (2017) note the difficult symmetry between such resistance and 
academic left critiques of ‘depoliticised’ technocratic rationalism. They highlight the much- 
quoted response of UK Conservative politician Michael Gove (a ‘Leave’ campaigner in the 
Brexit referendum) to economists’ predictions of the dire consequences of a Leave outcome: 
‘I think people in this country have had enough of experts’. These arguments reify the notion 
of ‘common sense’ ‘gut’ feeling over rationalist research, and they are often accompanied in 
many right populist quarters by a strand of criticism that refutes expert research and opinion 
by calling into question its objectivity. For example Nigel Farage, the then leader of the right 
wing populist UK Independence Party (UKIP), stated that many independent experts who 
argued that the UK should remain in the EU ‘were actually in the pay of the government or 
the EU’ and thus biased (Deacon, 2016).  
 
Again this line of attack by the radical right echoes academic left critiques of the supposed 
‘objectivity’ of academic research. For example, the ideals of dispassionate, neutral, ‘rational’ 
enquiry that are traditionally valued in the academy have long been identified and critiqued 
by feminists as masculinized (as well as highly classed and ‘racialised’) discourses (Hekman 
1990). Such discourses, if unchallenged, can work to legitimate forms of knowledge that 
perpetuate and exacerbate existing forms of social and economic inequality, and have, 
amongst other consequences, long influenced our very conceptions of those who can be 
conceived as authentic ‘intellectuals’, those that have the ‘right’ to enter and succeed in 
academia (Burke 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, as this paper goes on to explore, the anti-intellectual, anti-rational backlash 
against academic elites is not framed as a backlash against white masculinized ways of doing 
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or being – rather the language and framing devices utilized by populist anti-elitism often 
present these elites in explicitly feminised  terms, as I will go on to outline below.  
 
Methodology 
The data I will be drawing on has been collected as part of a wider ongoing project that is 
currently exploring representations of the ‘social world of the university’ through student-
produced online newspapers in 31 countries across the globe, from January 2016 to 
September 2017 (for a fuller account of methodology see Read, forthcoming). This 
timeframe arose by my desire to be able to cover the output of a student paper throughout the 
course of an academic year, and the timeframe would therefore allow me to cover universities 
who organised their academic year in January and those who began in September/October.  
 
In relation to the analysis, I utilised a combination of analytical approaches that 
complemented my own epistemological position (critical interpretivist) and theoretical 
perspective (a feminist poststructuralist perspective influenced in particular by Foucault 
(1977, 1979) and Butler (1997). As a feminist academic at a UK university who identifies 
with ‘left’ progressive politics, I felt explicitly invested and positioned in the debates and 
clashes around ‘free speech’ that I had previously been aware of through social media and 
through discussions on my own campus, but that were given greater visibility and intensity to 
me through my research through the archives.   
 
In order to explore these debates and the discourses that infuse them, I utilised the following 
complementary analytical approaches: firstly, a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis approach as 
adapted by Waitt (2005), who outlines some more explicit/practical ways in which to 
undertake a Foucauldian analysis than Foucault himself outlined. Finally, I was also guided 
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by a thematic analysis framework (Clarke and Braun, 2013) in order to organise and facilitate 
the comparison of emerging themes from the analysis.  
 
Although I originally included all 31 newspapers in my analysis for this paper, it became 
clear that debates specifically around ‘free speech’, ‘safe spaces’ and ‘no platforming’ in the 
context of the rise of ‘Trumpism’ and the radical right, was an issue raised primarily by the 
authors of student newspapers I had analysed from the UK , Australia and – not surprisingly 
– the USA. Although there were highly important, impassioned debates around related 
concerns in papers in other countries – for example the Rhodes Must Fall movement in South 
Africa and the growth of the Fees Must Fall movement in the same country, and 
protests/debates in relation to the right-wing Hindu nationalism of the BJP in India – for 
reasons of space I have not focused on these here. Similarly, the need to narrow down the 
scope for this paper led me to decide on my primary focus around a single issue – the 
invitation of a controversial radical right speaker, Milo Yiannopoulos, to speak at the 
University of California, Berkeley in late 2016 - as covered in posts in The Daily Californian, 
the university’s student newspaper. The issue was chosen due to its prolific coverage in the 
paper - I initially isolated 265 relevant articles dealing with these themes in the time period of 
the research, with 74 specifically mentioning the Yiannopoulos event and its aftermath - 
hence allowing me to make some tentative analysis of discursive trends in discussion with a 
relatively specific focus.  
 
I have in addition utilised material from the following student papers:  Branding Iron 
(University of Wyoming, USA); Spartan Echo (Norfolk State University, Virginia, USA); 
The Hilltop (Howard University, Washington, D.C., USA); and The Student (University of 
Edinburgh, Scotland, UK).  Due to the lower volume of posts on these issues in comparison 
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to the Californian I have not attempted to isolate trends or patterns in these papers but have 
used this material as extra examples relating to the trends found in the Daily Californian 
posts. For ease of reference, when citing the posts in text I have utilised an abbreviation of 
the university’s name (rather than the lesser known newspaper title) followed by date of 
posting. 
 
 
The ‘Real-world-Anti-Elitist’ discourse 
 
As discussed above, anti-intellectual discourses are not new, merely heightened in the last 
decade and given greater exposure and legitimacy by the election successes of individuals 
such as Trump, and are given new articulation in their targeting of increasingly popular 
‘resistant’ practices on campus such as ‘no platforming’ and the call for ‘safe spaces’. As I 
will go on to discuss, the ‘Real World Anti-Elitist’ and ‘Ivory Tower Rationalist’ discourses 
refute the right of students or staff to refuse a platform to speakers, or to designate any part of 
the campus as spaces that are off-limits to other students or staff. In particular, both 
discourses condemn what is seen as the excessive emotionality, sensitivity and weakness of 
proponents of such ‘safety strategies’, and both make recourse to the notion of ‘free speech’ 
to make the case that students have no right to protect themselves from the views or actions 
of others that they might find upsetting or dangerous to their wellbeing. 
 
What distinguishes the line of thought I’ve labelled the ‘Real World’ discourse is an anti-
elitism that seeks to position the ‘pro-safety’ students as a naïve, cocooned and 
‘mollycoddled’ group whose past and present privilege has led them to feel entitled to protect 
themselves from views with which they disagree. Such forms of protection - seen in 
 8 
explicitly feminised terms – are contrasted with the ‘real world’ into which students must 
eventually emerge, and for which they will be ill-equipped, for this ‘real world’ is a harsh, 
tough environment in which they will have to learn to have ‘thicker skin’ and be able 
themselves to fight and win over others. As O’Keefe (2016) notes in relation to attacks on the 
‘safe space’ strategy in particular, “implied in much of this debate is a disdain for safe spaces 
as soft, emotive, over-protective, feminised spaces that do not reflect the hard, ‘real world’” 
(87).  
 
Of the three discourses I outline in this paper, the ‘Real World’ discourse is definitely a 
minority discourse as presented in the pages of the Daily Californian, as could be expected 
for a majority left/progressive student readership. Instances of this position mainly arose in 
reports that aimed to present multiple viewpoints to a story, or seeking to present a 
‘counterpoint’ to majority opinion. Nevertheless, repeated examples can be found – in the 
Californian and other student newspapers in the study - of the discursive use of language to  
position supporters of safe spaces/no platform strategies as over-emotional and weak in 
implicitly or explicitly feminised ways: some examples include ‘petulant’ and ‘juvenile’ 
(Wyoming May 04 16), ‘special snowflakes’ (Berkeley March 16 16); and even ‘hysterical 
loons’ (Berkeley April 10 17).  As well as the gendered connotations of feminine ‘weakness’ 
implied in words such as  ‘hysterical’ (King, 1993), some terms used are also explicitly 
homophobic, for example the following statement utilising the pejorative term ‘pansy’, often 
used in homophobic jibes: 
 
Safe spaces, unjustified and frivolous use of trigger warnings and movements to ban 
certain ideas and language are all ways in which so many Millennials are making 
victims and outright pansies of themselves. (Wyoming May 04 2016) 
 9 
 
References to the need for students to face the ‘real world’ are repeatedly made by 
proponents of this discourse, for example: 
 
Once you walk into this campus, you must understand that what you learn may offend 
you, anger you, terrify you and may even reduce you to tears, but those are 
experiences you need to cope with in the real world (Berkeley April 10 17) 
 
Similar sentiments are found in a report outlining reaction to the Yiannopoulos protests by 
Trump’s campaign manager, Kellyanne Conway: 
 
“I don’t even know if they know what they’re protesting. Is it the free speech?” 
Conway said. “In the real world, when these kids grow up and go try to find jobs, 
which they will in the Trump economy — life doesn’t work that way, folks.”  
(Berkeley February 02 17)  
 
This discourse is one that can be seen replicated in gendered right-wing rhetoric of the over-
protective ‘nanny state’ (Sawer 1996), or higher education systems that provide too much 
support for students who should be able to ‘fend for themselves’ independently (Leathwood 
and Hey 2009). The ideal of the ‘independent’ student has been shown to be highly gendered, 
classed and ‘raced’, assuming a student trajectory straight from school, a self-confidence 
bolstered by support and advice of friends and family with relevant university experience, 
and of a life with no caring responsibilities or paid work obligations (Leathwood 2006). The 
ideal of ‘independence’ is nevertheless assumed to be generally shared by all students in 
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posts such as the one below, where the author takes issue with the notion that safe spaces 
imply women and minority ethnic students are not able to take care of themselves: 
 
We’re told that they’re about the free speech of women and minorities. But what this 
really suggests is that, unlike straight, white men, women and minorities cannot be 
expected to handle speech which is offensive to them without the caring hand of the 
SU [Student Union] (Edinburgh January 25 16). 
 
It is also found in many ‘common-sense’ arguments that argue that children and adults 
complaining about bullying and harassment in the school and workplace are insufficiently 
tough and resilient and conducting themselves in ways inappropriate for the ‘real world’: 
pupils and students are told they need to toughen up and retaliate because they need to learn 
what it will be like in the world of adults (Newman, Woodcock and Dunham 2006), and 
adults are told they are no longer children and need to put up with things (Tracy, Lutgen-
Sandvik and Alberts 2006).   
 
Collective performances of ‘tough’ masculinity reach its exaggerated epitome within fascism 
and neo-fascist movements, one strand of the new ‘radical’ or ‘alt-‘ right. As Miller-Idriss 
(2017) discusses, this philosophy is founded on the valorization of a masculinity that is 
highly militaristic and authoritarian, stressing both belonging and camaraderie between men 
and ‘the urge to express anger and frustration at mainstream society’ (200). Such groups are 
the more extreme manifestations of more everyday ‘normative cruelties’ (Ringrose and 
Renold 2010), including the use of verbal attacks as ‘humour’ - of the heteronormative 
powerplays in everyday life.  
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Such discourses of tough, masculinised aggression arguably infuse the performances of both 
radical right speakers such as Yiannopoulos and the political speech of Donald Trump. 
Neither Trump nor Yiannopoulos align in their embodied presentation of self the form of 
idealised heteronormative athletically fit male body that is traditionally revered by fascists 
(Miller-Idriss 2017), and Yiannopoulos himself has noted that he is disliked by openly 
fascistic elements of ‘alt-right’ (in part for his sexuality and Jewish heritage - Panella  2017). 
Whilst Trump has tried to use his physical stature to intimidate (for example on the debate 
stage against Hillary Clinton – see Smith 2016), for both their primary articulation of 
aggression is verbal. The link between such ‘aggressive’ performances and the desire for 
power in relation to fame or popularity is one that is explicitly made by some critics in the 
student newspapers I looked at. For example, in criticism of Yiannopoulos’ visit, one student 
wrote:  
 
His campus events are one long publicity stunt designed to present himself as a kind 
of hip, far right, youth folk hero — sort of Hitler Youth with cool sunglasses. “Look 
at me, I’m so rad, the PC police won’t let me speak on campus.” That’s his whole 
shtick in a nutshell, along with bigotry (Berkeley Jan 17 17) 
 
Moreover, although not prominent within the posts of the student newspapers themselves, 
there were glimpses of the forms of intensely emotional language and acts against protestors 
by those on the radical right in reports of radical right disturbances and demos, graffiti and 
posters on campuses. For example,  the dichotomy between the purported ‘strength’ of the 
radical right and the ‘weakness’ of the left can be seen in a report of a shooting at a Milo 
Yiannopoulos talk at the University of Washington, which quotes a Facebook message left 
before the talk by one of those arrested: ‘I’m going to the Milo event and if the snowflakes 
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get out off hand I’m just going to wade through their ranks and start cracking skulls.’ 
(Norfolk April 26th 17)  
 
So how does this ‘Real World’ anti-elite discourse define the notion of ‘truth’, knowledge 
and ultimately the university itself? From a Foucauldian/Butlerian perspective, such a 
discourse not only constructs the university and university students in specific ways (as 
‘weak’, as ‘privileged’, as feminised) but also constructs the ‘university’ and the ‘real world’ 
as two distinct and exclusive spheres, with the former’s ‘unreality’ marking its weaker, 
inauthentic position in regards to a wider populist ‘truth’. In radical right antipathy towards 
universities and student culture, we can arguably at times see both an anti-intellectual, anti-elite 
refutation of progressivism in academic culture, and an attempt to challenge or undermine the 
conception that academia has any authority to define ‘truth’.  Decoupled from the ostensibly 
legitimating principles of academic objectivity and rigor, the ‘truth’ can then become a notion 
that is defined and legitmated through an individual or group’s power to ‘shout the loudest’.  A 
notable feature of Trump’s 2016 was the extent to which Trump proclaimed a version of reality 
that he supported as the ‘truth’ even when faced with insurmountable evidence to the contrary, 
lying on a scale far surpassing previous presidential candidates (Finnegan 2016). Trump’s ability 
to proclaim a position as truth despite lack of evidence, or indeed flying in the face of evidence to 
the contrary, was amply demonstrated by his own tweet on the Yiannopoulos debate, where he 
cast the protestors as the group committing violence on ‘innocent’ supporters of Yiannopoulos: 
‘If U.C. Berkeley does not allow free speech and practices violence on innocent people with a 
different point of view — NO FEDERAL FUNDS?’   
 
In a recent newspaper article historian Jill Lepore cautioned against the notion that ‘post-truth’ 
politics originated with Trump, stating “it is simply wrong to imagine that Trump’s election 
somehow changed the status of truth overnight” (Goldstein, 2016, p.21). Nevertheless the 
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ascendance of a key proponent of this discourse to the presidency of the most powerful 
country in the world is, in Foucauldian terms, a key legitimator for the ‘Real World’ anti-
elitist discourse that is aligned with right-wing views on the need for individual ‘toughness’ 
and resilience, and in its more extreme versions, a radical right notion of ‘strength through 
power’ and the populist notion of ‘truth’ as that which is defined by ‘the people’ – or at least 
the leader of the people.  
 
The Ivory Tower Rationalist discourse 
 
Critics that utilise elements of the ‘Real World’ discourse tend to combine this strand of 
thought with reference to a far more widespread critical position – that of the defence of ‘free 
speech’ and debate of alternative views on university campuses. For example, the Berkeley 
College Republicans argued that one reason for inviting Milo Yiannopoulos was “because he 
raises taboo political topics that our club believes are necessary for, and essential to, a 
complete political debate” (Berkeley Jan 27 17).  As we shall see, recourse to the notion of 
‘free speech’ also underpins an aligned but distinct discourse of criticism against safe spaces 
and no platforming that I’ve called here the ‘Ivory Tower rationalist’ discourse. Both 
discourses make a distinction between the space of the university and the space of the outside 
world. However, whilst the ‘Real World’ discourse tends to present the university negatively 
as an out-of-touch bastion of the elites, the ‘Ivory Tower’ discourse tends alternatively to 
valorise the university as the ideal site of disinterested, objective, rational debate. Although 
not quite as prevalent as the final, ‘progressive’ discourse in the articles of the Daily 
Californian, examples of the ‘Ivory Tower’ discourse were much more common in the 
articles of the Daily Californian than the ‘Real World’ discourse, and appeared in single-view 
‘opinion’ articles as much as those seeking to report multiple viewpoints.  
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These critics tend to critique the emotionality of no-platforming and ‘safe spaces’ due to the 
encroachment of the messy feelings of subjectivity into the rationality of the process of 
debate. In the ‘Ivory Tower’ discourse, the abstract ‘rational’ principle of ‘free speech’ is a 
cherished academic ideal that trumps the possibility of harm from hearing such speech.   In 
the controversy over the Milo Yiannopoulos invitation, UC Berkeley’s campus 
administration stated:  
 
While we realize that the presence of certain speakers is likely to upset some 
members of our campus community, University policy, principles of intellectual and 
academic freedom, and the U.S. Constitution require that students and faculty 
members retain the right to invite individuals onto campus to participate (Berkeley 
December 4th 2016). 
 
This was a position that was more reluctantly reached by others who vehemently opposed the 
views of the radical right, yet felt that principles of free speech on campus should prevail, 
especially at a university with a history of radical protest that created the Free Speech 
movement in the 60s, that eventually led to the enshrinement of its principles in the 
university’s own constitution. Whilst some writers expressed sympathy with the protestors at 
Berkeley, others articulated a more binarised conception of protestors as ‘juvenile’ , in 
opposition to the ‘reason’ of the ‘educated adult’ university: 
 
Donald Trump was sworn in as the 45th president of the United States on Jan. 20. 
Liberals can no longer simply cover their ears and shut their eyes to reality, for there 
will no be escaping conservative politics any longer. It is time to mature and realize 
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that you will encounter people with whom you may not agree, but the adult, educated, 
reasonable thing to do is to ignore them and move on if you cannot otherwise befriend 
them or tolerate their company (Berkeley 27th January 2017) 
 
There are some echoes here of the ‘Real World’ discourse that places protestors as juvenile, 
emotional ‘snowflakes’. However, as mentioned above, in this ‘Ivory Tower’ discourse, the 
emphasis is explicitly on the ‘specialness’ of the university as a site where the Enlightenment 
forces of reason and the ‘light of truth’ must triumph over the forces of emotion (and 
presumably unenlightened ‘darkness’):  
 
The Berkeley College Republicans believe that we should err on the side of more 
speech instead of less. Our campus is not a “safe space,” and true to Cal’s motto, “Fiat 
lux,” light will be shed upon issues in ways that some may find uncomfortable. 
(Berkeley 27th January 2017) 
 
This leads us to the epistemological underpinnings of the Ivory Tower discourse, which 
arguably lie in the modernist belief in the possibility of ‘objective’ rational knowledge, and 
an ontological position on the possibility of objectivity itself.  However, from the mid-
twentieth century onwards a growing number of academics have questioned the objectivity of 
knowledge in the academy - both in relation to science and epistemologies such as positivism 
within the social sciences, and the androcentric and Eurocentric bias surrounding what is 
considered to be ‘great’ art and literature (Leathwood and Read 2009). Postmodernist 
critiques have questioned the very possibility of objective knowledge, and feminist critics 
highlighting the genderedness of Enlightenment conceptions of rationality and ‘truth’, with 
its assumptions that only men – and only white men - can be ‘rational’ and thus be producers 
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of truly scientific knowledge (see e.g. Hekman 1990; Hill Collins 1990; Harding 1991). 
Moreover, writers such as Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) compellingly critiqued the ways in 
which academic culture (including academic language and conventions of speech and action) 
reflected upper-class and middle-class cultures and practices, mitigating against the success 
in the academy of those unable to pass through its corridors ‘like a fish in water’ (127).  
 
Whilst some of the populist ‘anti-elite’ arguments against students on the left made use of 
similar notions of ‘free speech’, the anti-elite discourse is an uncomfortable fit with 
discourses of the Ivory Tower that emphasise the superiority of the (traditional) academy in 
arguably ‘elitist’ terms.  Indeed the position of some students seemed to be explicitly to 
present themselves as firmly and proudly on the side of the ‘elite’, for example the following 
post by a writer concerned at the implications of the protest for the reputation of the 
university and the cultural capital connected to its social status: 
Unlike the coterie of right-wing commentators enjoying a field day this week, it does 
me no pleasure to see something like this happen at my alma mater (one can almost 
feel the value of his diploma plummeting downwards). (Berkeley February 3rd 2017). 
 
 
Countering the Critics: the Contextual Progressive position 
 
Needless to say, there was a wide range of counter-criticism to both these discourses in the 
pages of the Daily Californian and other student papers in defence of safe space policies and 
of ‘no platforming’ as a form of protest. One notable strand of defence against both the ‘Real 
World anti-elitist’ and especially the ‘Ivory Tower rationalist’ discourse is a discernible 
collection of arguments that I have tentatively labelled here ‘progressive’, that was slightly 
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more prevalent than the ‘Ivory Tower’ discourse, particularly in single-view opinion pieces. 
I’ve labelled this position as contextual due to the tendency in these arguments not to assume 
a universal moral equivalence between positions, and the significance attached to the relative 
social positionings, privilege and political power of  individuals and groups involved in 
instances of contestation.  
 
This position argues that, firstly, no platforming and safe spaces do not deny ‘free speech’ for 
anyone, only the right for certain groups not to have to be an audience to this speech in 
certain delineated spaces (either particular rooms or buildings on campus, or the university 
itself) (O’Keefe, 2016).   Secondly, proponents argue that the mobilisation of such strategies 
is not merely against views or opinions with which students on the left disagree. Rather they 
are a mobilisation against speech or actions that are argued to potentially cause a high degree 
of anxiety or fear by some in less socially privileged social positions  (Butler, 1997; Ahmed 
2014).  
 
At Berkeley and elsewhere these include radical calls to action that invoke strong language 
that implies physical as well as vocal resistance (and indeed there was extended debate in the 
Californian in the aftermath of the Yiannapoulos visit as to whether violence is ever justified 
in such instances): 
 
The Berkeley Against Trump coalition calls on all solidarity-minded members of the 
campus to fight for this true legacy of FSM. The far-right is getting organized against 
us — we must get organized against them. The first step is coming out en masse to 
kick Yiannopoulous and his hateful bile off our campus. (Berkeley January 31st 2o17) 
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As this quotation suggests, the notion of collective ‘belonging’ is a powerful motivation for 
resistance to, as well as proponents of, right wing movements, in this instance a conception of 
protection of a space felt as ‘ours’ from an invasion by those who would cause harm.  
 
A strong thread through this discourse is the argument that freedom from harm should take 
precedence of unlimited freedom of expression. In this they make use of historical precedents 
in the history of activism.  O’Keefe’s (2016) discussion of the practice of no-platforming 
includes a brief history of the origins of the practice in anti-racist and anti-fascist organising. 
Noting that UK’s National Union of Students adopted no-platforming as a policy in 1974 to 
protest against fascist organising on university campuses, she quotes the then NUS President, 
John Randall’s argument in defence of the policy: “What [is] the greater freedom? An 
abstract notion of freedom of speech, or a right to live in freedom from fear of persecution”? 
(Dickinson, 2015, in O’Keefe, 2016, p. 86). 
 
This is the position taken by Judith Butler and eleven other Berkeley professors who sent a 
letter to the Chancellor, Nicholas Dirks, calling for the Yiannopoulos event to be cancelled. 
In a later interview Butler explicitly linked this argument to the nature and purpose of 
universities in relation to fostering learning. Noting the distinction between speech that is 
constitutionally protected and speech that is a form of harassment, she argued:   
 
We are as a university bound to protect students, staff, and faculty, from behavior that 
creates a hostile climate. That is why the kinds of conduct that Yiannopoulos 
engages in are not permitted in the classroom, and would in fact be subject to 
disciplinary action, if they were (Berkeley 23rd January 2017). 
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Others made a similar point that Yiannopoulos’ views are meant as insults rather than as 
academically valid argument, and therefore are disqualified from being allowed airing in 
academic debate:  
 
The claim members of BCR make that Milo’s views are needed for us to “fully 
develop intellectually” is utter nonsense. Any valid conservative principles actually 
worth debating are lost under his hateful polemics that dehumanize large swaths of 
our campus community. While members of BCR are free to use their “critical 
thinking skills” to discern substantive content among Milo’s invective, I’ve used mine 
and have deduced that a man who can’t treat many of my friends with basic human 
decency doesn’t deserve any rational consideration whatsoever.  . . . Hatred, however 
“humorously” delivered, does not constitute valid intellectual opinion and will not be 
received kindly. (Berkeley 1st February 2017.) 
 
For the progressive position, then, the mobilisation of policies such as safe spaces and ‘no 
platforming’ is premised on the notion that more than a place of learning, the university 
should – in principle at least - be an arena where such learning is undertaken in an 
environment of safety. It is this notion of the role and purpose of the university as facilitating 
‘learning within safe bounds’ that lies at the heart of protests by a group of Howard 
University students (HU Resist) calling for the ‘banning’ of Donald Trump from the campus 
(Howard 21st April 17). During Trump’s presidential campaign rumours began to emerge on 
campus that Trump himself may visit the university, leading to HU Resists’ campaign. 
Central to their argument was the need to maintain Howard University as a whole as a ‘safe 
space’ for African American students to learn. Echoing O’Keefe’s and Butler’s arguments 
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above, students from Howard note that this call (both a call for a ‘safe space’ and a call to ‘no 
platform’ the President), is not a call denying free speech:   
 
This is not a ban on conversation or interaction, this is simply a ban on coming into 
this sanctity of our space,” said Durmerrick Ross, a freshman political science major. 
“If he would like to have a conversation or interaction or engagement with us, we are 
not opposed to him inviting us to the White House. We are not opposed to him renting 
out a convention center. (Howard 25th February 17). 
 
Such conditions of safety and protection will never of course be absolute – especially when 
increasing numbers of students – and staff – experience forms of prejudice and harassment in 
daily life and interactions, and/or material precarity in relation to working and living 
conditions. Nevertheless, like the Berkeley protestors it is an openly political call for a degree 
of protection from harassment from radical right positions and their symbolic leaders, 
whether Yiannopoulos or Trump himself. 
 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper I have attempted to outline some of the debates and positions taken both in 
favour of, and against, the strategies of ‘safe spaces’ and ‘no platforming’ on university 
campuses, in the current political climate of a resurgent right-wing populism across many 
countries in the global North. I have discussed what seems to be two similar, yet distinct, 
discourses of criticism – the ‘Real World Anti-Elitist’ and the ‘Ivory Tower Rationalist’ – 
that are both highly, yet slightly differently, gendered, classed and racialized. Both are 
distinguished by a binarised notion of the university and the ‘outside world’, although these 
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spaces are differently valorised. And importantly both are arguably underpinned by 
epistemological and ontological conceptions of knowledge and ‘truth’ that have implications 
for our understandings of the role and purpose of the university itself. These conceptions are 
countered by a range of left wing positions including a strand which I have tentatively called 
‘contextual progressive’ – which is itself arguably underpinned by a third epistemological 
position that is critical in nature, openly denying the possibility that views and opinions can 
or should be treated as moral equivalents.  
 
It is inevitably harder from this perspective to devise a general policy position that guides 
decisions as to whether a speaker should be given a ‘platform’ on campus, as the power 
dynamics between speaker and audience (and the wider student body) will necessarily vary 
according to context. Indeed, from a poststructuralist perspective, there is no single ‘true’ 
nature or meaning of a speech act, as the meaning of speech does not ultimately lie with the 
words themselves, but in their interpretation by others (Butler, 1997; Ahmed, 2014).  This 
lack of fixity can potentially make it difficult in advance to definitively determine whether 
and to what degree an invited speaker may be ‘harmful’ in their speech or actions. 
Nevertheless, agreeing with Butler, Smith (2001) notes that ‘hateful’ speech generates an 
effect only because it is able to call “upon the accumulated force of similar discourses – 
spoken words, written texts, and actual conduct – from the past” (395). These chosen words 
then contain – and have arguably been chosen by the speaker precisely because they contain - 
a socially recognised resonance that Ahmed (2014) calls ‘stickiness’.   
 
It is then in anticipation of future repetitions of such speech, and the potentiality of the 
harmful effects/affects that may be generated, that some students and faculty then aim to 
counter on a localised level with the forms of protest described in this paper – and by doing 
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so challenging both the masculinised discourse of the ‘radical right’ and its challenge to the 
public valorization of the ‘Ivory Tower’, and also the traditional discourse of the university 
itself in regards to the ideal of – and possibility of – the disinterested pursuit of ‘truth’. What 
seems likely is that with the resurgence of populist political movements across the Global 
North, such clashes over the ‘freedom’ of speech and the nature and purpose of the university 
are likely to continue and intensify. 
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